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Abstract
The need of fiscal consolidation is likely to dominate the policy agenda in the next
decade; starting from statistical evidence on the conduct of fiscal policy in the EMU area
over the last decade, this paper addresses the optimality of alternative fiscal consolidation
strategies. We explore the welfare properties. In this paper we explore the welfare properties
of debt-targeting fiscal policy implemented through, alternatively, distortionary taxation on
consumption, labour and capital income or productive and wasteful government expenditure.
We build a general equilibrium model with various distortions in order to evaluate the welfare
ranking of alternative fiscal policy configurations under different monetary policy regimes.
Our results show the welfare superiority of fiscal adjustments based on productive government
expenditure, whereas the use of a capital income tax rate as fiscal instruments yields the
highest welfare loss.
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paolo.zagaglia@riksbank.se. The views expressed herein are those of the authors only and should not be attributed
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1 Introduction
The process of cutting-back the massive stock of public debt accumulated after the 2008-2009
recession is likely to dominate the policy debate over the next decade. Table 1 shows the change
in levels of the debt/GDP ratio in major industrialized countries from 2007 to 2010.
These figures suggest that the question is not so much whether to implement a fiscal
consolidation, but rather how to do it. Specifically, whether it would be preferable to carry it out by
cutting public expenditure or by increasing average tax rates on factor incomes and consumption.
The issue of whether fiscal adjustments should rely on the expenditure rather than the revenue
side is hardly a new topic in the policy debate. Its importance was already emphasized by the
January 2004 ECB Monthly Bulletin (p.46)
“The composition of the budgetary adjustment is particularly relevant, there being
evidence that an expenditure-based adjustment tends to be more growth-friendly and
long-lived than a tax-based adjustment without expenditure retrenchment.”
Looking at the case-studies of Ireland and Denmark in the Eighties, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)
were the first ones to suggest that fiscal adjustments implemented on the government spending
side could be expansionary. This view is confirmed by Alesina and Perotti (1997), who examine a
full sample of OECD countries and find that adjustments relying on government expenditure cuts
had a better chance of being successful and expansionary; on the other hand, if they are based
on tax increases and cuts in public investments, tend not to be non-persistent and contractionary.
This result is strengthened by Alesina and Ardagna (2009) who extend the analysis up to 2007.
Using a panel OECD from 1970 to 2007, they define fiscal adjustments (stimuli) as episodes where
the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves (deteriorates) by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP.
Subsequently they investigate whether such episodes - that differ in size and composition - are
associated with booms or recessions and with success in debt stabilization. Their conclusion is that
most successful fiscal adjustments are those in which a larger share of the reduction of primary
deficit is due to cuts in current spending (wage and non-wage component) and to subsidies.
Based on these considerations, in this paper we introduce a new dimension to assess the
desiderability of alternative debt-stabilizing plans: what are the welfare effects (and not simply
the growth effects) of fiscal adjustments based on the expenditure rather than on the revenue side?
To accomplish this task, we adopt a suitable DSGE framework calibrated on the Euro area, as the
focus of our analysis is mainly targeted at the EU policy debate. As we employ a workhorse for
policy analysis, as the DSGE model has become, we also refer to the related rich literature on the
interactions between monetary and fiscal policy.
The seminal contribution by Leeper (1991), featured by Ricardian environment and lump-sum
taxation, established the parameter conditions for local equilibrium determinacy based essentially
on the size of monetary policy’s response to inflation. If Taylor’s principle holds, determinacy is
preserved regardless on fiscal policy’s active or passive stance. This implies that monetary policy
is conducted without any influence arising from fiscal considerations: the fiscal authority merely
raises tax revenue so to balance the intertemporal budget constraint, and the dynamic of debt is the
main factor determining the tax stance1. If, alternatively, monetary policy’s feedback rule is not
1In many contributions that have borrowed and modified the original Leeper’s framework (Sims (1994), Davig
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enough to affect the real interest rate,an active role of fiscal policy is needed to restore equilibrium
determinacy. In particular, another strand of literature (“the fiscal theory of the price level”,
Woodford (1994), Sims (1994), (Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba, 2001)) stresses the likely emergence
of price level adjustments that are automatically needed in order to guarantee the intertemporal
solvency of government budget constraint.
Ever since Leeper (1991) the literature began to relax some of the simplifying assumptions
which were part of the original framework, in order to be able to study the interactions between
fiscal and monetary policy in a richer and more realistic framework2.Basically, contributions differ
insofar as they employ alternatives strategies to depart from Ricardian equivalence. One strand
of literature models the presence of non-Ricardian consumers à-la Blanchard (1985), by assuming
a non-zero probability of death for households (Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), Chadha and Nolan
(2007)). Under this specification, consumers’finite-horizon implies a wealth effect of government
debt on aggregate consumption via the Euler equation. In this scenario C. and Thadden (2008)
prove not only that steady-state government debt becomes a crucial state variable for determinacy
of local equilibrium and its dynamics, but also that its level is important: the required degree of
fiscal discipline is an increasing (but yet discontinuos) function of the debt level when monetary
policy is to become more active3. Other contributions have broken Ricardian equivalence by
introducing distortionary taxation, and have looked at the non-trivial interactions with monetary
policy (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004c, 2007), Edge and Rudd (2002), Linnemann (2006)).
Our paper follows this latter approach, insofar as we introduce (multiple) distortionary taxation
and implement a welfare analysis via second-order perturbation methods. Furthermore, the novelty
of our contribution lies in the emphasis on the choice of the fiscal instrument. Particularly, we build
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with multiple sources of distortions, and
perform a welfare evaluation of the use of different fiscal instruments. In particular, we compare
the welfare properties of rules for fiscal policy that prescribe changes in different tax rates or types
of government spending. Within each of these two categories, we operate a further distinction: on
the spending side between government consumption and productive public spending, whereas on
the revenue side between three types of distortionary taxation (on consumption, labour and capital
income). Our analysis also distinguishes between monetary policy based on interest rate or money
growth rules.
We obtain a number of results. We find that fiscal consolidation based on productive
government expenditure (defined broadly as public spending enhancing the marginal product of
capital and labour in the production function) is welfare-superior to other specifications. On the
other hand, fiscal adjustment based on capital-income taxation generally bring about the highest
welfare losses. These ‘corners’ of targeting instruments’welfare ranking seem robust to a various
specifications of the interest-rate rule, and even to an alternative specifications of monetary policy
and Leeper (2005), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2007, C. and Thadden (2008)), the relevant parameter of the fiscal
rule is the feedback coefficient of (lump-sum) taxes on debt. The fiscal stance is passive if the coefficient is larger
than the steady-state real interest rate, active otherwise. C. and Thadden (2008) note that many authors typically
tighten the definition of fiscal policy to one ensuring not only the solvency of intertemporal budget constraint, but
also stationarity of government debt.
2While acknowledging many significant open-economy contributions (Linnemann (2006), Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2000)), we focus here on closed-economy investigations.
3Their paper also links the approach à-la-Blanchard with an alternative way to introduce non-Ricardian
consumers, namely the use of credit-constrained (or “rule-of-thumb”) agents (Galì, Lopez-Salido, and Vallès (2004),
Bilbie (2009)). They show that the crucial qualitative results are robust to the alternative specifications.
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based on money growth. These results are not significantly reversed even if we assign a ‘useful’ role
to government consumption, by inserting it additively into the utility function (e.g., see Linnemann
and Schabert, 2004). Another relevant result concerns the ranking of (unconditional) welfare
losses according to the degree of distortions in the economy. For any given fiscal instrument, the
departure from perfect competition and the presence of money yields greater welfare losses than
the introduction of price rigidity within a monopolistic competition framework.
We believe our result concerning the welfare-superiority of a government spending rule as fiscal
instrument to be particularly relevant for daily policy-making. Recent experiences (primary UK,
but also Italy although to a lesser extent) attempted to peg government spending dynamics to the
evolution of macroeconomic targets. Our framework can contribute to a better understanding of
the relative desiderability of such an option.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some statistical evidence which is useful
to pave the way for the normative analysis. Section 3 describes the theoretical model. Section 4
outlines the computational strategy for the solution of the model. Section 5 discusses the calibration
of the model. Section 6 outlines the quantitative results. Section 7 presents some concluding
remarks.
2 Empirical Evidence
Our theoretical question regards the welfare properties of fiscal consolidation, defined as a negative
reaction of budget deficit to public debt accumulation. In this section we present our own
econometric evidence regarding the plausibility of such an investigation using Euro-area aggregate
quarterly data from 1999 to 2010. Particularly, in subsection 2.1. we estimate a Structural
Vector AutoRegressive model in order to obtain an empirical characterization of primary deficit’s
movements in response to debt. In subsection 2.2. we perform a correlation analysis focused on
the relationship between budget deficit’s components and the stock of government liabilities.
2.1 A SVAR Analysis on the EU area
In this subsection we build and estimate a VAR model to illustrate the dynamics of average EU
fiscal positions after a public debt shock.
The general structural form of model is given by:
A0Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + ut (1)
where Xt is a m x 1 vector of endogenous variables, A0 is a m x m matrix capturing
contemporaneous relations among variables; A(L) is a finite-order vector polynomial in
non-negative powers of the lag operator; finally ut is the m x 1 structural disturbance vector.
Pre-multypling (1) by A−10 we obtain the reduced form we can actually estimate:
Xt = B(L)Xt−1 + ξt (2)
where B(L) = A(L)A−10 and ξt = A
−1
0 ut is the reduced-form residual vector.
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Our first attempt consider m = 3, so that vector Xt is given by:
Xt = [Yt, D
PR
t , Bt]
where Yt is real GDP, DPRt is primary deficit, Bt is real stock of government debt. All variables
are seasonally-adjusted. We use quarterly EU data taken from Thomson Datastream. The sample
period is 1999Q1-2010:Q1.
Identification is achieved through a standard lower-triangular Cholesky scheme, where we
allow within-the-quarter effect of real activity on everything else and of primary deficit on debt.
Figure 2 shows the response of real output and deficit to a one-standard-deviation shock in
government debt.
The left-hand panel shows a negative reaction of economic activity to debt-shocks, although the
statistical significance ceases after 3 quarters. More interestingly, the right-hand-panel indicates
that EU-aggregate primary deficit reduces after increase in the stock of government liabilities.
This suggests the presence of a debt-stabilizing motive in the conduct of EU fiscal policy in the
last ten years.
We test the robustness of our central result by extending to m = 4 the dimension of vector X,
which is now made by:
Xt = [Yt, D
PR
t , Bt, pit]
where pit is the CPI inflation index4. In this case we added the inflation rate which is allowed
to be affected within the quarter by all other macroeconomic variables. Figure 3 displays the
impulse response functions relative to this new specification.The picture confirms the negative
response of primary deficit after an increase in the stock of government debt.
Our SVAR estimation seems pretty robust in indicating a debt-stabilizing motive in the
conduct of fiscal policy during Euro’s first decade. Before turning to a formal model to investigate
the welfare properties of such a stance, we disaggregate primary deficit into the spending and the
revenue component and analyze their statistical correlations with government debt.
2.2 Correlations
In Table 2 we report summary statistics for the main fiscal variables, seasonally adjusted. We
filtered all variables by using HP filter for quarterly data, with λ set equal to 1600, as it usual. It
is worth to note that public debt displays more volatility than public expenditure and tax revenue.
This might be due to financial market effects, via interest rate changes, affecting the burden of
public debt. In general, we can note a non-significant deviation from normality hypothesis for the
4Note that we cannot further extend the dimension of our VAR, given the relatively limited number of
observations. This constraint, in turn, is given by our focus on the EU aggregate area.
5
data generation process of such time series.
In Table 3 we report the autocorrelation for debt, public expenditure and tax revenue. It is
immediate to note a negative autocorrelation pattern for debt for lag larger than the 4th. For tax
revenue autocorrelation becomes negative right after 6 lags. Public expenditure, instead, shows
a similar structure but with a much smaller decay rate than what can be observed for the other
variables. In this case, the cyclical component of public expenditure appears to be short-lasting.
This means that public expenditure is largely affected by trending component, due to the political
economy budgeting processing.
After these preliminary statistics, let us move to the analysis of comovements between tax
revenue (T , henceforth) and debt (B) and between public expenditure (G) and debt. This analysis
is supporting the empirical evidence outlined in the previous subsection where we showed that
primary deficit reacts negatively to government debt shocks. At this stage, we disentangle primary
deficit into its two components (G and T ) and we look at the comovements between them and
public debt at various time horizon.
Table 4 and 5 collect our results. We note that while government expenditure has a negative
correlation with public debt starting from lag 2 (lag 1 is close to be zero), tax revenue displays a
positive comovement, starting from lag 2.
We take these findings as a confirmation of the pattern already inferred in our structural VAR
analysis: since the EMU start date (1999:1) there is evidence of a fiscal policy being conducted
in order to stabilize public debt. This implies a negative (positive) response of government
expenditure (tax revenue) to government debt. The rest of this paper aims to investigate the
welfare consequences of such fiscal stance.
3 The model
We build a New Keynesian DSGEmodel with a number of imperfections: monopolistic competition,
quadratic price-adjustment costs, transaction costs for money holding, and multiple distortionary
taxation. There are infinitely-live households on the demand side and two sectors on the
supply-side: one producing intermediate goods by means of capital and labour - and the other
a final good, obtained by assembling all intermediate goods. The homogenous final good can be
used for private and public consumption, investment and productive government expenditure. The
policy side is composed by a fiscal and monetary authorities. The former acts by moving either tax
rates or government expenditures in response to the stock of public debt, while the latter follows
either interest rate or money-growth policy rules.
3.1 Households
The demand side of the economy is populated by a measure of consumers indexed by j ∈ ω1.
Each agent enjoys utility from current consumption cjt and disutility from hours worked `jt. The
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history of events st = {s0, . . . st} up to date t is attached a time-0 probability mass µ(st). The
uncertainty in the choice process is summarized by the conditional-expectation operator E0[·] :=∑
st+1 µ(st+1|st). Given this structure, the household j’s allocation problem takes the form:
max
{cjt,`jt,Mjt,Djt}∞t=0
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtUj (cjt, `jt)
]
(3)
with the intertemporal discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), and subject to the budget constraint:
(1 + τ ct )Pt [1 + ψtM(Vjt)] cjt +Mjt +Djt + Ptijt
≤ (1− τ `t )Ptwjt`jt + Pt
[
(1− τkt )rt + τkt δ
]
kjt + Rt−1Djt−1 +Mjt−1 +Πjt (4)
Money is a choice variable in this model, and enters the household’s budget constraint both
directly and indirectly. The indirect channel arises from the presence of transaction costs in the
product markets. In order to purchase an amount Ptcjt of consumption goods, the consumer faces
an additional expenditure of PtcjtψtM(Vjt). The transaction cost function M(Vjt) : R+ → R+
depends on the velocity of money:
Vjt :=
Ptcjt
Mjt
(5)
The additional term ψt indicates a multiplicative transaction cost shock:
ln [ψt+1] = ρψ ln [ψt] + (1− ρψ) ln
[
ψ¯
]
+ σψ²
ψ
t+1 (6)
with ²ψt ∼ N(0, 1).
The portfolio of financial assets includes government bonds Djt and claims ωjι on the profits
of the monopolistically-competitive firms. The gross interest rate on bonds is denoted as Rt. Let
Πjιt denote the dividend stream generated by firm ι and appropriated by household j. The total
dividend payment for household j is:
Πjt :=
∫
ι∈ω2
ωjιΠιtdι (7)
For the sake of analytical simplicity, we assume that the allocation of ownership shares across
agents is constant, and beyond the control of households.
Consumers control the evolution of the individual-specific capital stock kjt through their
individual decisions on investment ijt. Idiosyncratic capital is rented to the firms of the
intermediate-good sector at the rate rt. The accumulation of capital takes place according to
a standard linear law of motion:
kjt+1 = ijt + (1− δ)kjt (8)
Three types of distortionary taxes enter the consumer’s budget constraint. There are taxes on
consumption, labor income, and capital income at the average rates τ ct , τ `t and τkt respectively.
Consumption taxes enter as indirect taxes. Capital taxes are imposed on the real return of capital,
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rather than on nominal returns. Following Kim and Kim (2003a), we introduce a depreciation
allowance on capital taxation, and rt is the rental rate of capital.
3.2 The final-good sector
The firms in the final-good sector are mere retailers. They face a perfectly competitive
product market. Their production function consists of a Dixit-Stiglitz technology that aggregates
intermediate goods:
yt ≤
[∫
ι∈ω2
y
θ−1
θ
ιt dι
] θ
θ−1
(9)
The demand for each intermediate good yιt follows from the static profit maximization problem:
max
{yιt}ι∈ω2
Pt
[∫
ι∈ω2
y
θ−1
θ
ιt dι
] θ
θ−1
−
∫
ι∈ω2
Pιtyιtdι (10)
and takes the form:
yιt =
[Pιt
Pt
]−θ
yt (11)
The price index of final goods can be derived as:
Pt =
[∫
ι∈ω2
P1−θιt dι
] 1
1−θ
(12)
3.3 The intermediate-good sector
In the intermediate sector, firm ι ∈ ω2 uses capital and output as production inputs according to
a constant returns-to-scale technology:
yιt ≤ ztkαιt`1−αιt (gpt )ζ (13)
where zt is an exogenous stationary productivity shock:
ln[zt+1] = ρz ln[zt] + (1− ρz) ln [z¯] + σz²zt+1 (14)
and ²zt ∼ N(0, 1). I introduce nominal price rigidity in the form of quadratic price-adjustment
costs:
C(Pιt) := φp
2
( Pιt
Pιt−1 − pi
)2
yt (15)
where pi denotes steady-state inflation. This specification differs from the standard menu cost
approach of Rotemberg (1982), whereby firms face costs for changing prices independently from
the size of the change itself. In equation 15, only price changes that deviate from the steady state
are costly. Ireland (2001) shows that adding a lag structure to equation 15 is key to generating
a realistic degree of inflation persistence on US data. Smets and Wouters (2003) instead adopt
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a Calvo (1983)-style setting. They assume that only a random fraction of firms can re-set prices
according to the optimal price index. Under quadratic adjustment costs, all firms can change their
pricing policies as the costs of price stickiness become prohibitive.
The problem of firm ι involves choosing prices and quantities such that expected profits are
maximized:
max
{Pιt,`ιt,kιt}∞t=0
E0
 ∞∑
j=0
Ξt+j
(Pιt
Pt
yιt − wt`ιt − rtkιt − C(Pιt)
) (16)
subject to the constraints 11 and 13.
3.4 Fiscal policy rules
The government faces a standard flow budget constraint:∫
j∈ω1
Djtdj + Ptτt +
∫
j∈ω1
Mjtdj = Rt−1
∫
j∈ω1
Djt−1dj + Ptgt +
∫
j∈ω1
Mjt−1dj (17)
Real total taxation is denoted as τt, and gt indicates total government spending. The government
issues one-period riskless (non-contingent) nominal bonds denoted by Dt. Total revenues from
taxation are decomposed into consumption taxes τ ct , capital taxes τkt and labor taxes τ `t :
τt := τ
c
t
∫
j∈ω1
Cjt [1 + ψtM(Vjt)] dj + τkt
∫
j∈ω1
(rt − δ)Kjtdj + τ `t
∫
j∈ω1
wjt`jtdj (18)
The literature on public finance provides plenty of results of equivalence between different types
of taxes in terms of economic impact. However, these results arise in static models that include
only a limited number of frictions, and it is doubtful whether these kinds of equivalence can be
reproduced in the present framework. Total public spending is composed by a pure consumption
c and a productive p part:
gt :=
∫
ι∈ω2
gpt +
∫
j∈ω1
gct (19)
We also specify the intertemporal budget constraint of the government:
Rt
∫
j∈ω1
Djtdj ≤
∞∑
p=0
Et+p
(
1
Rt+p
)p[ ∫
j∈ω1
Mjt+pdj
−
∫
j∈ω1
Mjt−1+pdj + Pt+pτt+p − Pt+pgt+p
]
This amounts to saying that the maximum level of outstanding debt in every period should not
exceed the discounted sum of seignorage revenues and primary surpluses. Although not emerging
from the notation, the intertemporal budget constraint should hold for every realization of the
stochastic shocks. This result is due to Bohn (1995), who shows that economies that fall short of
this requirement need not ensure sustainable debt policies.
This paper is concerned with the business cycle costs of the operation of fiscal policy. Hence,
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specifying the way fiscal policy works off the steady state is a crucial. Two views are often put
forward, and are presented in the next two subsections.
3.5 Targeting through taxation
The Monthly Bulletin of the ECB for January 2004 reviews the conduct of fiscal policy in the
EMU area. The interpretation of the events of the transition period towards the Single Currency
is especially revealing (see page 44):
“(T)he major consolidation efforts undertaken between the early 1990s and 1997 suggest
that the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the adoption of the EU fiscal framework
successfully promoted fiscal discipline during that period. However, consolidation was
largely based on revenue increases, while primary expenditure rose slightly on average
in the euro area.”
This hints to a scenario where public spending is strongly exogenous. Standard real business
cycle models include sources of government spending in the form of autoregressive process. For
reasons that will be made clear in section 5.2, we assume that both productive and unproductive
public expenditures are fixed to their steady state levels. The average tax rate is instead set to
bring about the required consolidation.
We assume that total taxation evolves according to an iso-elastic function of the ratio between
current and steady-state fiscal deficit. Recent papers like Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and
Railavo (2004) propose fiscal reaction rules of an error-correction type. Full adjustment towards
the fiscal target takes place in a few quarters in those rules. Our formulation intends to capture
the more plausible idea of slow and persistent changes in taxation. Coherently with both the
establishment of the Maastricht Treaty, and the theoretical literature on fiscal policy rules, we
consider public debt- targeting.
The model includes average tax rates on consumption, labour and capital income. From an
operational point of view, these are the three instruments that the government can employ. Since
we aim at disentangling the effects of adjusting different tax rates, we consider one average tax
rate as a policy variable at a time. For instance, after fixing the tax rates on both labour income
and consumption at their steady state levels, we assume that the tax rate on capital income is
endogenous according to the policy rule:
τkt (rt − δ)kt
τ¯k(r¯ − δ)k¯ =
[
dt−1
d¯
]ν1
(20)
where lower-case letters are variables in real terms, variables with upper bars are evaluated at the
steady state, and ν1 ≥ 0.
The question arises as to whether this simple rule fulfills the intertemporal budget constraint
of the government. The answer is a positive one, on the condition that we restrict our attention
to equilibria where all the real variables are bounded in a small neighborhood of the steady state.
Only in this case tax rules of the form of equation 20 not raise any problem. Another way of
looking at the issue is that, in equilibrium, the government sector and the private sector are
mirror images of each other. This implies that imposing the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint substitutes for the usual transversality condition in the consumer’s optimization problem
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in equilibrium. Then, the issue is whether the transversality constraint is satisfied, and the same
logic applies.
3.6 Targeting through public spending
The ECB Monthly Bulletin for January 2004 also addresses the strategies of fiscal consolidation
undertaken by the Member States since 1998 (see p. 46):
“Public finance developments thus present at best a mixed picture since 1998. (. . . )
Again, on average in the euro area, no significant expenditure restraint was exercised.
These developments are largely responsible for the fact that the average deficit for the
euro area is estimated to have been close to 3% of GDP in 2003, with some countries
in excessive deficit.”
The assessment continues on page 48:
“(S)trategies changed in many countries as regards revenue but not as regards
expenditure policies. (. . . ) Concerns about the distortionary effects of heavy taxes
on incentives (. . . ) led to a policy strategy giving priority to tax cuts over the need for
budgetary discipline.”
In other words, the ECB supports the view for which successful fiscal consolidations should be
financed through primary spending cuts.
In this scenario, the average tax rates of consumption, capital and labor income are fixed at their
steady-state levels. The policy prescription outlined above requires me to re-define the baseline
rule along the lines of 20. When government consumption is the instrument for fiscal restraints,
gpt is capped at the steady state, and:
gct
g¯c
=
[
dt−1
d¯
]ν1
(21)
with ν1 ≤ 0. Public spending is thus fully controllable by the government, and takes up the duty
of accomodating the changes in revenues due to exogenous shocks.
3.7 Equilibrium and aggregation
Definition 1 A symmetric monopolistically-competitive equilibrium consists of stationary
sequences of prices:
{Pt}∞t=0 := {P ∗t , R∗t , w∗t , r∗t }∞t=0 (22)
real quantities:
{Qt}∞t=0 :={{Qht }∞t=0, {Qft }∞t=0, {Qgt }∞t=0}
{Qht }∞t=0 :={c∗t , `∗t , k∗t+1, i∗t ,m∗t , d∗t }∞t=0
{Qft }∞t=0 :={y∗t , k∗t , `∗t }∞t=0
{Qgt }∞t=0 :={gc∗t , gp∗t , τ c∗t , τk∗t , τ `∗t ,m∗t , d∗t }∞t=0
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and exogenous shocks:
{Et}∞t=0 := {²zt , ²ψt }∞t=0 (23)
that aggregate over ω1 = [0, 1] and ω2 = [0, 1], that are bounded in a neighborhood of the steady
state, and such that:
(i) given prices {Pt}∞t=0 and shocks {Et}∞t=0, {Qht }∞t=0 is a solution to the representative
household’s problem;
(ii) given prices {Pt}∞t=0 and shocks {Et}∞t=0, {Qft }∞t=0 is a solution to the representative firms’
problem;
(iii) given quantities {Qt}∞t=0 and shocks {Et}∞t=0, {Pt}∞t=0 clears the market for goods, factors of
production, money and bonds:
y∗t =
∫
j∈ω1
[1 + ψtM(V ∗t )] c∗t dj +
∫
j∈ω1
i∗t dj + g
∗
t +
∫
ι∈ω2
C(P ∗t )dι (24)
k∗t =
∫
ι∈ω2
k∗t dι =
∫
j∈ω1
k∗t dj (25)
`∗t =
∫
ι∈ω2
`∗t dι =
∫
j∈ω1
`∗t dj (26)
m∗t =
∫
j∈ω1
m∗t dj (27)
d∗t =
∫
j∈ω1
d∗t dj (28)
(iv) given quantities {Qt}∞t=0, prices {Pt}∞t=0 and shocks {Et}∞t=0, {Qgt }∞t=0 and satisfy the flow
budget constraint of the government;
(v) fiscal policy is set according to one of the processes for either τ∗t or g∗t described in section 3;
(vi) the central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a simple policy rule.
4 Computations
Since the aim of this work is to characterize the costs of arrangements of monetary and fiscal
policy, special care needs to be put on the welfare calculations. To that end, solution methods
based on first-order approximations of the optimality conditions of the model have been shown to
yield inaccurate results (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007; Kim and Kim, 2003b).
Woodford (2003, chap. 6) shows that a first-order solution is welfare-accurate only if the
deterministic steady states is equivalent coincides with the first-best equilibrium. This condition
breaks down along several directions. Distortionary labor taxation prevents long-term employment
from reaching the level that would be achieved in a fully competitive setting. The introduction
of subsidies for removing the bias arising from the monopoly power in the intermediate sector is
disregarded. Also, the stylized economy is characterized by transaction frictions that give rise to
a positive demand for money at the steady state.
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4.1 Local validity of approximation
Second-order perturbation methods are defined only around small neighborhoods of the
approximation points, unless the approximated function is globally analytic (see Anderson, Levin,
and Swanson, 2004). Since the conditions for an analytic form of the policy function are hardly
establishable, the problem of validity of the Taylor expansion remains. I approach this issue
at different levels. First, we calibrate the processes for exogenous shocks in such a way that
their fluctuations are constrained within small intervals (see also Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007).
Second, we impose ad hoc bounds that restrict the stochastic steady states of some variables to be
arbitrarily close to their deterministic counterparts.
Kollmann (2003) raises the issue of providing appropriate bounds for the fluctuations of public
debt. There are both technical and economic reasons for that. Coherently with historical evidence
on industrialized countries, the model should generate a dynamics of financial assets such that
the government is a net debtor in the long run. Following Kollmann (2003), we consider only
rational-expectations equilibria that fulfill the following constraint enforced ex-post:∣∣∣E [dˆt]∣∣∣ < 0.01 (29)
where the hat denotes the deviation from the steady state. This means that the long-run value of
real public debt is constrained around the non-stochastic steady state.
We also impose a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates:
E [Rt] > κσRˆt (30)
with a constant κ, and σRˆt as the unconditional variance of Rˆ. This constraint rules out policies
that are excessively aggressive. The reason is that large deviations of the nominal rate of interest
from the steady state are likely to prescribe violations of the zero bound at some point in time.
This type of limit on interest rates is admittedly tighter than that of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004b) over the regions with E [Rt] < R¯.
4.2 Welfare evaluation
According to the second-order approximation of the policy function, aggregate welfare is defined
as the expected lifetime utility conditional on the initial distribution of state variables s0:
W0 := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtUj(sjt)
∣∣∣s0 ∼ (s,Ω)]
' Uj(s)
1− β +
[
∇Uj(s) 12vec
(∇2Uj(s))′ ]
[
Θ1
(
s
vec(Ω + s s′)
)
+Θ2σ
2
]
where s and Ω are, respectively, the mean and the covariance matrix of the distribution of the
initial state of the economy, and Θ1 and Θ2 are suitable matrices.
An alternative to the conditional welfare level is represented by the unconditional expected
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instantaneous utility:
W := E [Uj(st)] ' Uj(s) +
[
∇Uj(s) 12vec
(∇2Uj(s))′ ]Θ3σ2 (31)
This unconditional welfare index disregards the transition costs arising from moving from one
steady state to another, and has been argued to produce incorrent welfare rankings (see Kim,
2003). Thus, correction-bias methods have been proposed to avoid the occurrence of ‘spurious
welfare results’ (see Kim and Kim, 2003b and Sutherland, 2002). Both the conditional and the
unconditional welfare levels are computed using the formulas presented in Paustian (2003).
In order to compare the outcomes of different policies, we compute the permanent change in
consumption, relative to the steady state, that yields the expected utility level of the distorted
economy. Given steady states of consumption c¯ι and hours worked ¯`of the model ι, this translates
into the number ∆ιc such that:
∞∑
t=0
βtU ιj
(
[1 + ∆ιc] c¯
ι
j ,
¯`
j
)
=Wι0 (32)
The interpretation of this equation goes as follows. Four elements determine the size of the
welfare metric. On the right-hand side of the equality, the deterministic steady state, its stochastic
counterpart, and the transition from the deterministic to the stochastic long-run equilibrium of ι.
On the left-hand side, instead, the deterministic steady states of the model with respect to which
the current distorted economy is compared, i.e. the ‘benchmark’. Since the full model of section 2
includes a large number of rigidities, disentangling the welfare impact of the sources of sluggishness
requires comparing smaller models where some sources of rigidity are switched off. This generates
the additional complication of comparing the welfare costs in models with different non-stochastic
steady states. And the computation of the welfare costs due to pure transitional dynamics is not
straightforward any longer. Two observations arise.
On the one hand, we should choose a benchmark common for all the models. On the other, in
doing so, the transition between deterministic steady states enters the scene as a determinant of
∆ιc. Since ¯` does not change across models, c¯ is the source of the problem. The relation between
deterministic steady states of consumption can be cast as:
c¯ιj = [1 +$
ι] c¯bj (33)
where c¯bj accrues to the benchmark, c¯ιj to the distorted economy ι, and $ι is the measure of
steady-state equivalent variation in consumption. The measure $ιc of transitional welfare costs
follows from the following equality:
(1 +$ιc)(1 +$
ι)c¯bj = (1 +∆
ι
c) c¯
b
j (34)
Given $ι and ∆ιt, the welfare costs due to the transition between the deterministic and the
stochastic steady states are captured by:
$ιc =
1 +∆ιc
1 +$ι
− 1 (35)
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Contrary to what is done in existing papers like Kollmann (2003), we cannot use the
deterministic steady states as conditioning means of the initial states, for that would bias the
welfare ranking of policies. Since there is no source of time inconsistency in the models, optimal
policy produces the highest conditional welfare. What matters, then, is that one uses the same
initial distribution across both policies and models (see Kim, 2003). We follow the practice of
setting both conditioning means and conditioning covariances to zero.
Unconditional welfare costs are computed in a fashion similar to the conditional counterpart:
U ιj
(
[1 + ∆ιuc] c¯
ι
j ,
¯`
j
)
=Wι (36)
In this case, transitions between steady states do not affect the welfare index, and all the dynamics
refers to instantaneous ‘jumps’. When the benchmark model has steady-states different from those
of the current model, the welfare costs $ιuc due to adjusting expected utility to Wι are computed
like in 35.
5 Functional forms and calibration
We assume that the felicity function Uj : R+ × [0, 1] → R+ is time-separable in consumption and
hours worked:
Uj (cjt, `jt) :=
[
(cjt)
γ1(1− `jt)1−γ1
]1−γ2 − 1
1− γ2 (37)
where γ2 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption substitution. The transaction
cost functionM(Vt) : R+ → R+ is increasing and convex with respect to money velocity. Convexity
rules out the possibility of zero money demand with a positive nominal interest rate in the steady
state. We borrow the following specification from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a):
M(Vjt) := aVjt + b
Vjt
− 2
√
ab (38)
The implicit money-demand function from the first-order conditions takes the form:
mt =
[
1
a
{
b+
1
(1 + τ ct )ψt
(
Rt − 1
Rt
)}]−1/2
ct (39)
The model is calibrated on yearly data for the Euro area from 1999 to 2004. Since no standard
calibration for this economy has been proposed for some of the deep parameters, we start out
by taking the steady state values of some observable variables as given. On the basis of those,
we compute the observables. The steady-state inflation rate is assumed to be 5% a year. The
intertemporal discount factor β of consumers resulting from the calibration is equal to 0.9926,
which is higher than what is usually assumed for yearly models. The intertemporal elasticity of
substitution 1/γ2 equals 0.6667, and lies within the range of values usually assigned in the RBC
literature with γ2 between 1 and 3. The weight of the consumption objective γ1 for the model with
money equals 0.352. The resulting steady-state gross rate of interest is 1.0578.
For the calibration of the money-demand function, we search for a combination of a and b that
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produce both a money velocity, and an interest semi-elasticity of money broadly consistent with
European data at the steady state. We find that values of 2.1 and 0.03 for a and b, respectively,
generate a semi-elasticity of approximately -1.67, which is within the range of the estimates
of Brand and Cassola (2004) for the Euro area. However, these parameter values generate a
steady-state money-income velocity of 0.51, and overshoot the estimates of existing studies like
Brand, Gerdesmeier, and Roffia (2002).
The capital share α of output is set equal to 0.3, such that the steady-state fraction of labor
income is approximately 70%. The depreciation of capital δ is 10% a year. The ratio between
capital and output at the steady state is 2.2, which is the value proposed by Smets and Wouters
(2003). The steady-state amount of labor services ¯` is usually calibrated equal to 1/3 based on
US data. Prescott (2003) provides evidence of a sizeable wedge in the amount of market work in
Germany, France and Italy with respect to the US in the 90s. Following his findings, I choose ¯`
equal to 0.2.
The elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor services follows from the calibration
of the average wage markup of 16% used in (see Bayoumi, Laxton, and Pesenti, 2004). The degree
of monopolistic competition θ is set in such a way that the markup of prices over marginal costs
is 22%, which is a reliable estimate for European countries according to Bayoumi, Laxton, and
Pesenti (2004). The productivity shock has the quantitative properties estimated by Smets and
Wouters (2003), with a value of one at the steady state.
The steady-state ratio between total government spending and output is calibrated in such a
way that the public debt-output ratio is in the range of 50-55%. Since we compare optimal policies
in smaller models without money demand, we need to adjust the calibration of the output share
of public spending accordingly. The reason is that we cannot find any reasonable figures such that
the ratio between debt and output is of comparable magnitude across models. We choose to adjust
the fraction of government consumption g¯c/y¯. The model with money can sustain a larger share
of government consumption - 38.6% - than the model without money - 30.7% - due to the presence
of seignorage revenues at the steady state. We keep the fraction of productive spending capped at
0.04.The figures for average taxation on consumption, capital and labor suggest a steady-state ratio
between total taxation and output of 0.31 in models , which is in line with the empirical evidence.
The average tax rates for capital, consumption and labor are taken from Kim and Kim (2003a),
and are based on estimates for Germany, France and Italy. The value of the productive-spending
elasticity of output ζ is taken from Andrés, López-Salido, and Vallés (2001).
We finally set the parameter σ of the state-space representation of the model equal to 1.
Finally, the zero lower-bound on nominal interest rates involves the parameter κ set to 2. Table 1
summarizes the calibration of the model.
Having fully dealt with those issues, we are ready to carry out the welfare analysis under
several directions. First, we distinguish between interest rate and money supply specifications
of the monetary policy rule; we compute welfare measures (as described in the previous section)
conditional on the different tax instrument employed by the fiscal authority under both monetary
policy stances. In case of interest-rate rule, we further distinguish between the cashless economy
and the model with money. Furthermore, we carry out some additional robustness exercises.
Determinacy issues are dealt with in Table 2, which illustrates the coverage of determinacy regions
(as a percentage of grid points) under cashless and money economy.
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6 Results
This section contains the results of the welfare analysis. First we present the results referring
to a cashless economy (both with zero and positive money demand), further distinguishing
between fully-optimized policy rules and standard parametrization. Then we analyze the case
of a money-growth rule. Finally, we compare the results according to the degree of distortion in
the economy.
Under this first specification, we have a cashless economy and the monetary authority sets the
nominal interest rate according to a standard general formulation of the Taylor rule:
Rˆt = αRRˆt−1 + αpipˆit + αy yˆt (40)
where hats denote log-deviations from the deterministic steady state:
xˆt := ln
[xt
x¯
]
(41)
Table 3 reports the combinations of fully-optimized coefficients of the policy rules and the
corresponding welfare metrics5. Each line identifies the parameters’ combination delivering the
highest welfare. Left-hand side of the table refers to the cashless economy, whereas right-hand side
includes money. Starting from the former, we look at the conditional welfare measure and we notice
- focusing on time varying distortionary taxation or government spending targets - that the lowest
welfare loss is obtained in case of productive government spending as fiscal policy instrument, with
a unit feedback coefficient in response to deviation of last-period government debt from steady-state
level. The highest loss, on the other hand, is achieved when the stabilization role is beared by
capital-income taxation.
Turning to the unconditional welfare measure, it is worthwhile to comment the last column’s
results: models with money and lump-sum taxes display a larger$ι than models with distortionary
taxes. That’s due to the fact that consumption taxes enter money demand which, in turn,
determines steady-state consumption. The joint presence of positive money demand and
non-distortionary taxation determines the following chain of events: no consumption taxes mean
higher consumption and thus higher money velocity, which in turn causes higher money demand
in equilibrium and lower ‘pure’ consumption for purchase of goods and services that we would
have in the case of distortionary taxes. In fact, as it is evident from consumer’s budget constraint,
the government is not able to distinguish (and so tax differently) between consumption for pure
consumer’s motives, and consumption for transaction money-demand motives6. In terms of welfare
evaluation, this effect counterbalances the role of money in the government budget constraint, and
so determines a higher steady-state equivalent variation in consumption.
Table 4 shows the results in case of monetary policy rule coefficients set at the standard
reference values, rather than subject to the grid search procedure as in the previous table. Under
Taylor’s parametrization (φpi = 1.5 and φy = 0.5) conditional welfare loss is lowest in case of
government consumption targeting, whereas equilibrium is not determinate in case of constant tax
rate, capital-income taxation or productive government spending targeting.
5In case of lump-sum taxation, the corresponding tax burdens are calibrated so to replicate the steady-state
debt/output ratio than we would have in the same economies but with distortionary taxation.
6This ‘myopic’ behaviour of the government seems a fairly harmless assumption.
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Table 5 and 6 illustrate the same welfare calculations (with optimized feedback coefficients)
as in Table 3 but, respectively, with no interest-rate smoothing in the Taylor rule and no debt
targeting in the fiscal policy rules. Note that in the former case - which preserve our focus on
fiscal targets - the welfare superiority of productive government expenditure as fiscal instrument
is confirmed. So is the inferiority of targeting through capital income taxation.
Now we investigate an alternative specification for the conduct of monetary policy; instead of
interest-rate rules, we introduce a constant money-growth rate such as:
mˆt = µmˆt−1 (42)
The fiscal side remains the same as in the previous case. Table 7 shows the welfare results.
Again, each line - corresponding to a different fiscal policy instruments - reports the combination
of the policy rule parameters yielding the highest welfare configuration with respect to the proper
benchmark. This time the coefficients subject to grid search are merely two: the money growth
rate (µ) and the feedback coefficient of the fiscal instruments to the stock of public debt (v).
In case of distortionary taxation a constant money supply rule is always optimal (since there’s no
growth in this model), and the lowest welfare loss is achieved when it is accompanied by productive
government spending targeting. Under taxation targeting, the only case of non-zero response to
public debt is obtained under capital income taxation (with an elasticity of 0.3).
Table 8 is particularly important, as it reports the unconditional welfare measures - again
for each fiscal instrument - associated with different a different degree of distortions in the
model economy. Two results are noteworthy, one ‘horizontal’ and the other ‘vertical’ in terms
of visualization of the table. The ‘horizontal’ result is that, ceteris paribus, the distortions
arising from the presence of monopolistic competition and, although to a lesser extent, from the
presence of money are the most relevant. Moving from price flexibility to price rigidity (within a
monopolistic competition framework), on the other hand, does not deliver per se any additional
welfare losses. On the other hand, a ‘vertical’ reading of Table 8 delivers a fairly homogenous
welfare ranking: focusing on distortionary taxation, in cashless economies productive government
spending targeting yields the lowest welfare loss, followed by consumption taxation and then by
government consumption targeting. In monetary economies, instead, labour taxation (followed by
consumption taxation) is the optimal configuration.
6.1 Impulse response functions
We also calculated impulse response functions - meant as first-order approximation of deviations
from the deterministic steady state - of selected variables to productivity and money-demand
shocks7 under different fiscal policy instruments. They are calculated based on welfare-optimizing
parametrization. Figures 1-7 report the plots, with the upper panel showing the technology shock
and the lower panel the monetary one.
The dashed lines indicate the cashless economy, and the circled lines refer to a positive money
demand. After a positive technology shock, output and consumption increase under any targeting
instrument, as standard. Inflation decreases and as a result nominal interest rate also decreases,
7Obviously the latter involves the presence of a non-zero money demand, whereas in the former we consider both
specifications.
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since the feedback coefficient of the monetary policy rule on inflation is bigger that the one on
output. It is interesting to note, in monetary economies, a significant liquidity effect, captured by
the relevant increase in money holdings. Kim (2000) and Sims (1998) argue that such a strong
liquidity effects is made possible by the substantial amount of nominal and real rigidities in the
underlying structure of the model. While impulse response function retain the standard qualitative
effects under any targeting, we can emphasize the different quantitative response of endogenous
variables which are subject to distortionary taxation. With, alternatively, consumption, capital
income and wage as fiscal instruments we observe negative effect on the response of, respectively,
aggregate consumption, capital stock and hours worked to the positive productivity impulse.
7 Conclusion
In times of pressing need of fiscal consolidation, the relative desiderability of different fiscal policy
instruments deserves particular attention. We provided statistical evidence that in its first decade
fiscal policy in the Euro Area has followed a debt-stabilizing approach, reducing primary deficit
after a debt shock. However, whether this stance is welfare maximizing - and, most of all, which
side the adjustment should be implemented on - is still an open question. In this paper we built a
large-scale DSGE model with a considerable number of imperfections and attempted to provide a
welfare comparison of alternative fiscal policy tools according to different monetary policy stances.
Consistently with theoretical literature and the real world policy environment, fiscal policy targets
the accumulation of public debt, by increasing (decreasing) tax rates (government spending) in
response to fiscal imbalances. Our results show that employing productive government expenditure
as fiscal instrument in the feedback rule on debt is actually Pareto-improving under active
interest-rate- based monetary policy in a cashless economy. Other instruments - particularly capital
income taxation - lead instead to more consistent welfare losses. Modification of the economic
environment such as non-zero money demand in the cashless economy or money supply-based
monetary rules still preserve the qualitative properties of our welfare ranking, pointing towards
a relative desirability of productive expenditure-based fiscal adjustments rather than the active
utilization of distortionary tax instruments.
The general validity of such a conclusion might certainly be questioned by a more accurate
analysis, capable of including key aspect that we were forced to leave out here, such a deeper
consideration of the interactions between spending and revenue components of fiscal policy or a
more precise investigation of non-Keynesian effects. A possible further step might incorporate
some of the above suggestions so to be able to tackle into a DSGE framework more complex issues
such as non-linearities in fiscal policy effects of the size of government spending multipliers.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses
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Legend: The error bands are computed according to Antithetic Accelerated Monte-Carlo 10000 simulations
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Figure 2: Impulse responses
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Legend: The error bands are computed according to Antithetic Accelerated Monte-Carlo 10000 simulations
Figure 3: Impulse responses
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Legend: The error bands are computed according to Antithetic Accelerated Monte-Carlo 10000 simulations
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Figure 4: Impulse responses with lump-sum taxes as the fiscal-policy instrument, one std
productivity shock
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Legend: Circles and dashed lines denote the models with and without money demand, respectively. The plots report
first-order approximations of deviations from the deterministic steady states.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses with constant steady-state taxation, one std productivity shock
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Legend: Circles and dashed lines denote the models with and without money demand, respectively. The plots report
first-order approximations of deviations from the deterministic steady states.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses with consumption taxes as the fiscal-policy instrument, one std
productivity shock
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Legend: Circles and dashed lines denote the models with and without money demand, respectively. The plots report
first-order approximations of deviations from the deterministic steady states.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses with capital-income taxes as the fiscal-policy instrument, one std
productivity shock
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Legend: Circles and dashed lines denote the models with and without money demand, respectively. The plots report
first-order approximations of deviations from the deterministic steady states.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses with labour-income taxes as the fiscal-policy instrument, one std
productivity shock
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Legend: Circles and dashed lines denote the models with and without money demand, respectively. The plots report
first-order approximations of deviations from the deterministic steady states.
29
Figure 9: Impulse responses with government consumption as the fiscal-policy instrument, one std
productivity shock
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Legend: Circles and dashed lines denote the models with and without money demand, respectively. The plots report
first-order approximations of deviations from the deterministic steady states.
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Figure 10: Impulse responses with productive government spending as the fiscal-policy instrument,
one std productivity shock
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Legend: Circles and dashed lines denote the models with and without money demand, respectively. The plots report
first-order approximations of deviations from the deterministic steady states.
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Table 1: Evolution of Debt/GDP ratio, major industrialized Countries
Country Debt/GDP 2007 Debt/GDP 2010
Ireland 24.80 79.70
Luxembourg 7 14.50
Spain 36.20 62.30
United Kingdom 44.15 71
United States 63.05% 91.57
Netherlands 45.70 63.10
Finland 35.10 45.70
Portugal 63.60 81.50
Denmark 26.84 33.66
Germany 65.10 78.70
Belgium 83.90 100.90
Japan 167.10 193.97
Italy 104.10 116.10
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Public Finance Variables
Debt Public Expenditure Tax Revenue
Mean 2.64E-13 0.001969 0.003311
Median -4.21E-06 0.001297 -0.023953
Std. Dev. 0.267702 0.053201 0.163378
Skewness 0.310057 0.365543 0.189218
Kurtosis 4.092 3.525 2.224
Jarque-Bera 2.90
(0.2595)
1.385
(0.50)
1.270
(0.529)
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Table 3: Autocorrelations
lag Debt Public Expenditure Tax Revenue
1 0.552 0.262 0.576
2 0.344 0.090 0.472
3 0.126 0.059 0.303
4 -0.086 0.020 0.142
7 -0.376 -0.035 -0.255
8 -0.374 -0.205 -0.382
9 -0.358 -0.167 -0.400
10 -0.305 -0.058 -0.420
16 0.011 -0.186 -0.191
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Table 6: Calibration of the model
Description Parameter Value
Discount factor of households β 0.993
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/γ2 0.667
CES weight in the utility function γ1 0.358
Parameter of transaction cost function a 2.100
Parameter of transaction cost function b 0.030
Persistence transaction cost shock ρψ 0.962
Steady state of transaction cost shock ψ¯ 1.000
Standard dev. of transaction cost shock σψ 0.005
Rate of capital depreciation δ 0.100
Elasticity of substitution of intermediate goods θ 5.200
Capital elasticity of intermediate output α 0.300
Productive government spending elasticity ζ 0.100
Persistence of productivity shock ρz 0.820
Steady state of productivity shock z¯ 1.000
Standard dev. of productivity shock σz 0.001
Adjustment cost parameter of prices φp 10.00
Steady-state average capital tax τ¯k 0.266
Steady-state average consumption tax τ¯ c 0.163
Steady-state average labor tax τ¯ ` 0.403
Government consumption-output ratio g¯c/y¯ 0.346
Productive public spending-output ratio g¯p/y¯ 0.040
Parameter on zero bound for Rt κ 2
Parameter scaling exogenous shocks σ 1
37
Table 7: Coverage of determinacy regions as a percentage of grid points
Fiscal instrument No money Money
Lump-sum taxation 77.31
(0)
[0.14]
59.15
(0)
[6.06]
Constant taxation 15.14
(0)
[0.99]
21.14
(0)
[10.24]
Consumption taxes 77.31
(0)
[0.14]
79.81
(0)
[4.59]
Labour-income taxes 77.45
(0)
[0.01]
59.54
(0)
[5.42]
Capital-income taxes 16.01
(0.01)
[1.71]
41.97
(0)
[12.77]
Gov. consumption 77.36
(0.01)
[0.09]
79.98
(0)
[1.07]
Prod. gov. spending 18.81
(0.01)
[0.60]
49.39
(0)
[18.82]
Legend: Figures in round and square brackets indicate the percentages of grid points where
the zero-bound 30 on nominal interest rates and the public-debt condition 29 do not hold
respectively.
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Table 12: Optimized money-growth rules
Fiscal instrument µ ν Wι0 $ιc $ι
Lump-sum taxes 0.5 0.0 -105.2945 -0.0021
[-0.0021]
0
[-0.2247]
Constant dist. taxes 0.0 - -214.7549 -0.0015
[0.2684]
0
[-0.2128]
Consumption taxes 0.0 0.0 -214.7783 -0.0017
[0.2681]
0
[-0.2128]
Capital-income taxes 0.0 0.3 -214.7546 -0.0014
[0.2684]
0
[-0.2128]
Labour-income taxes 0.0 0.0 -214.7800 -0.0017
[0.2681]
0
[-0.2128]
Gov. consumption 0.0 0.0 -214.7549 -0.0015
[0.2684]
0
[-0.2128]
Prod. gov. spending 0.0 -0.1 -214.7512 -0.0014
[0.2685]
0
[-0.2128]
Legend: Benchmarks are the model’s own steady states (without brackets), and the
frictionless model with lump-sum taxation (inside square brackets).
Note: There are multiple parameter configurations that achieve the same welfare level
as that of the optimized rule.
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Table 13: Unconditional welfare costs of Taylor rules with interest-rate smoothing
Perfect competition Monopolistic competition
Price flexibility Price rigidity
Fiscal instrument No money Money No money Money No money Money
Lump-sum taxes −0.8324
(-5.06e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−0.9616
(0.3317)
[−0.2514]
−0.9422
(-5.21e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.0574
(0.2853)
[−0.2248]
−0.9421
(-4.39e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.0572
(0.2864)
[−0.2248]
Constant dist. taxes −1.2403
(-5.48e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.4251
(0.2998)
[−0.2305]
−1.4141
(-5.73e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5855
(0.2703)
[−0.2127]
−1.4140
(-3.32e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5858
(0.2698)
[−0.2127]
Consumption taxes −1.2401
(-1.61e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.4251
(0.2998)
[−0.2305]
−1.4139
(-1.88e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5849
(0.2715)
[−0.2127]
−1.4139
(-2.58e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5835
(0.2743)
[−0.2127]
Capital-income taxes −1.2403
(-5.26e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.4251
(0.2998)
[−0.2305]
−1.4141
(-5.08e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5855
(0.2703)
[−0.2127]
−1.4140
(-3.27e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5858
(0.2698)
[−0.2127]
Labour-income taxes −1.2403
(-5.40e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.4019
(0.3567)
[−0.2305]
−1.4141
(-5.73e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5682
(0.3051)
[−0.2127]
−1.4140
(-3.37e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5693
(0.3030)
[−0.2127]
Gov. consumption −1.2402
(-3.19e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.4251
(0.2998)
[−0.2305]
−1.4140
(-3.62e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5855
(0.2703)
[−0.2127]
−1.4140
(-3.43e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.4749
(0.5136)
[−0.2127]
Prod. gov. spending −1.2402
(-3.80e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.4251
(0.2998)
[−0.2305]
−1.4136
(2.09e-4)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5855
(0.2703)
[−0.2127]
−1.4074
(0.0107)
[-3.06e-14]
−1.5854
(0.2705)
[−0.2127]
Legend: Round and square brackets indicate, respectively, the unconditional welfare cost $ιuc and the steady-state
jump $ι with respect to the model with perfect competition, no money demand and lump-sum taxation. The
remaining figures are Wι.
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